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IMPLIED AND ORAL WARRANTIES AND THE PAROL
EVIDENCE RULE
By FiANx L. MECHEM*
I
MPLIED warranties of quality in connection with sales or con-
tracts for the sale of goods must usually be proved by evidence
of facts which are extrinsic to the contract. That is necessarily
so since the parties usually omit from the contract that information
which is the very foundation of an implied warranty of quality,
such as-that the goods have been bought by sample, ' or by
description from a dealer in goods of such description ;2 or that
the buyer has made known a particular purpose to the seller, and
has relied on the seller's skill and judgment in selecting goods fit
for such purpose.3 When the sale or contract of sale is oral, any
evidence necessary to show the presence of those elements is ordi-
narily admissible. At least it is never excluded because it is parol
evidence.4 Such situations may be dismissed without further
comment, since they do not involve the application of the parol
evidence rule.
Assume, therefore, a contract of sale in writing to which a
buyer is seeking to append an implied warranty of quality by
means of parol evidence. If the warranty is one of merchant-
ability, the buyer must show: (a) that the goods were bought by
description, (b) from a seller dealing in goods of that description,
(c) and that the judgment of the seller was actually relied upon in
respect to that quality of the goods. If a warranty of fitness for
*Professor of Law, University pf Idaho, Moscow, Idaho.
'Sales Act, sec. 16.
2Sales Act, sec. 15 (2).
3Sales Act, sec. 15 (1).4The parol evidence rule has no application to oral contracts.
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a particular purpose: (a) that he either expressly or impliedly
indicated the particular purpose to the seller, (b) and that the
judgment of the seller was actually relied upon in respect to that
quality of the goods.5 Also assume that the buyer can and does
offer parol evidence of such facts for the purpose of establishing
the implied warranty against the seller, and that the establishment
of the warranty is material to the buyer's case-what should be
the ruling of the court upon an objection by the seller that such
evidence is rendered ineffective by the parol evidence rule and is,
therefore, irrelevant and immaterial?
In a few cases the presence of those facts which are essential
to the implication of the particular warranty may appear from
some construction of the written contract, but in most instances
they can only be proved by extrinsic evidence of conversations or
communications had. at or prior to the execution of the writing.
Should such evidence be excluded, under the parol evidence rule,
as contradicting, adding to, or inconsistent with the terms of the
written contract?
A review of the authorities has disclosed but fragmentary dis-
cussions of the problem in the decided cases, and not all of them
are entirely in agreement upon the question. Yet it is a matter
of considerable importance to many lawyers and this fact, in the
writer's belief, justifies an attempt to extract what seem to be the
correct principles upon which to decide the question.
It seems self-evident that any defensible answer to the inquiry
must be predicated upon some combination of the following fac-
tors: the contents of the written contract, one's conception of the
proper nature and function of the parol evidence rule,-and a simi-
lar conception of implied warranties of quality. Taking the first
of these as the basis for discussion (for reasons more clearly ap-
pearing hereafter) the cases thereunder systematically fall into
four groups:
(1) Where the contract contains an express stipulation, in
substance negativing the existence of any warranties or obligations
not therein provided for.
(2) Where the contract contains an express warranty or war-
ranties, one or more of which is shown to be inconsistent with the
warranty sought to be imposed by implication.
(3) Where the contract contains an express warranty or war-
ranties, none of which are regarded as inconsistent with the pro-
posed implied warranty.
5Sales Act, sec. 15.
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(4) Where the contract contains neither express warranties
nor stipulations in regard to them.
Attention is called to the fact that in the cases falling in groups
(1) and (2) the particular warranty has been dealt with contract-
ually by the parties, thereby bringing it directly within the express
provisions of the agreement, whereas, in the cases of groups (3)
and (4), the parties have not dealt with the particular warranty
contractually in such a way as to bring it directly within the ex-
press provisions of the agreement. For convenience, the material
of this paper relating to implied warranties will correspondingly
be divided in two parts.
1. WHERE THE PARTIES HAVE DEALT WITH THE PARTICULAR
WARRANTY CONTRACTUALLY
Concerning the cases of group (2), where an inconsistent ex-
press warranty appears in the contract, not much need be said.
Unless one is prepared to maintain that the particular obligation
of implied warranty should be imposed by the law irrespective
of the wishes of both parties to the transaction, it is clear that no
warranty can be rationally implied for any purpose if an inconsis-
tent express warranty is found in the contract. There the parties
have mutually recognized the desirability of a warranty upon a
particular characteristic of the subject matter of the sale, and
have elected to put the warranty in written form, incorporating
it in the written contract, definitely expressing the nature and ex-
tent of the seller's obligation with reference to that characteristic
of the subject matter. Under such circumstances no room is left
for the implication of a warranty. The essential basis for implied
warranties of quality is the fair inference that the buyer relied
upon the seller for certain purposes and in respect to certain char-
acteristics or qualities of the goods.6 Therefore, where the war-
ranty is provided for by an express agreement which is made a
part of the contract of sale, the inference of reliance by the buyer
on the seller must necessarily be confined to the terms of the
express agreement, and by means of the parol evidence rule, all
oral evidence tending adversely to affect its legal operation (other
than evidence of fraud, mistake, etc.) should be excluded.7
611 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEw 485, 487.
7Alderson v. General Electric Co., (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1913) 210
Fed. 775; Wasatch Orchard Co. v. Morgan Canning Co., (1907) 32
Utah 229, 89 Pac. 1009; Ward v: Liddell, (1921) 182 N. C. 223,
108 S. E. 634; J. I. Case Plow Works v. Niles & S. Co., (1895) 90
Wis. 590, 63 N. W. 1013; Earle v. Boyer, (Ark. 1927) 289 S. W.
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If the foregoing remarks present an acceptable ratio decidendi
for the cases of group (2), it would seem to follow that the same
reasoning is applicable to cases of group (1) with correspondingly
similar results.8 The principle that a warranty of quality can only
be implied, rationally, where the written agreement of the parties
(representing their wishes and desires) expresses nothing incon-
sistent with the inference of reliance by the buyer upon the skill
and judgment of the seller (which inference would arise from the
extrinsic facts, if considered alone) as to some characteristic of
the goods in question, is as applicable in cases of group (1) as in
cases of group (2).
A number of authorities might be cited approving that view;
however, one or two will be sufficient.
A recent case from the Georgia court of appeals, Hoffman v.
Franklin Motor Car Co.,' involved the sale of an automobile, it
appearing that the written contract of the parties contained a stipu-
lation that "the vendor does not warrant said property and makes
no representation concerning same except that the title to same
is in the vendor, and free from incumbrances." Said the court:
"Where, without fraud, accident, or mistake touching its execu-
tion, the parties to a sale of personalty enter into a written contract
with respect thereto in which is contained a stipulation that 'the
vendor does not warrant said property and makes no representa-
fion concerning same except that the title to same is in the vendor,
and free .from incumbrances', such stipulation amounts to an
490; E. F. Elmberg Co. v. Dunlap Hardware Co., (Tex. App. 1920)
267 S. W. 258.
Since the parol evidence rule operates only to protect the con-
tratual obligations of contracting parties, it would here be inap-
plicable if in express warranty is not regarded as a contractual obli-
gation. While there is some conflict of authority, two things seem
to be true of express warranties: (1) it is not essential that they
should be part of the contractual obligation of the parties. They may
consist of mere representations as distinguished from promises.
Sales Act, sec. 12; Williston, Sales, sec. 194. (2) In the g-eat major-
ity of cases, they are part of the contractual obligation of the parties,
and the parol evidence rule applies to protect them. 27 Harv. L. Rev. 1.
SAgain in this class of cases a distinction must be made between
collateral, stipulations excluding warranties which are not part of the
contractual obligation, and terms of the contract, excluding war-
ranties which constitute an agreement. The parol evidence rule has
application only in the latter case, and it is purely a question of con-
struction of the contract, ordinarily, which view will be taken of such
terms. Since such limitations of liability are generally proposed by
the seller and accented or rejected by the buyer, it seems, upon prin-
ciple, that they should usually be regarded as contractual obliga-
tions. It also, seems probable that the parties to the contract or-
dinarilv so regard them.
9(1924) 32 Ga. App. 229, 122 S. E 896.
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express refusal by the vendor to warrant the property except as
to title, and the vendee cannot contradict the terms thereof by
pleading a breach of the other ordinary implied warranties of
the law or of express warranties and representations made by the
vendor prior to or at the time of the sale, as to the condition of
the property sold. Harrel v. Holman, 21 Ga. App. 159, 93 S. E.
1021; Payne v. Chal-Max Motor Co., 25 Ga. App. 677, 104 S. E.
453; Branch v. James, 4 Ga. App. 90, 60 S. E. 1027; Connell v.
Newkirk-George Motor Co., 28 Ga. App. 382, 111 S. E. 749;
Washington & LincoInton R. Co. v. Southern Iron & Equipment
Co., 28 Ga. App. 684, 112 S. E. 905."
This case did not mention the Uniform Sales Act, it not having
been accepted in Georgia.
In Minneapolis Threshing Machine Co. v. Hocking1 it was
objected that the exclusion of implied warranties by stipulation in
the written contract of sale was inconsistent with the provisions
of the Uniform Sales Act dealing with implied warranties. In
regard to the objection, the court said:
"The defendant further contends that the machinery pur-
chased by him was purchased for a particular purpose known
to the plaintiff, and therefore under the provisions of sub-
division 1, sec. 15, of the Sales Act (chapter 202, S. L. 1917),
there was an implied warranty that the machinery should
be reasonably fit for that purpose; that this implied war-
ranty was outside of and beyond the contract entered into
by and between the parties; that therefore the limitations of
thie contract as to notice and as to remedies in case of breach
were inapplicable in case of a breach of such implied warranty;
that here the evidence incontrovertibly establishes such a breach,
and so it follows that in considering such breach the damages
flowing from it and to be recovered therefor, and the notice w'th
respect thereto to be given, no regard need be paid to the terms
of the written contract. Defendant cites, as sustaining this con-
tention: ,Minneapolis Steel & Machinery Co. v. Cagey Laid
Agency et al. (N.D.) 201 N. W. 172; International Tlar'zester
Co. of America v. Thoms, 43 N. D. 199, 176 N. W. 523; Ad-
vance-Ruinely Thresher Co. v'. Geyer, 40 N: D. 18, 168 N. W. 731 ;
Kopan v. Minneapolis Threshing Machine Co., 39 N. D. 27, 166
N. W. 826; Comptograph Co. v. Citizens' Bank, 32 N. D. 59, 155
N. W. 680. We think, however, that these authorities do not
sustain the position thus taken by the defendant. The contract, in
the instant case, expressly excludes and negatives all statutory or
implied warranties excepting as to title, and further expressly
provides that in no event shall the company (the plaintiff) be
subject to any other or further liability, except such as may be
expressly given and provided for in the contract itself, and only
10(1926) 54 N. D. 559, 209 N. W. 996.
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on the conditions stipulated in the contract. The cases. cited are
all cases in which the warranties in question were not negatived
and excluded, and hold that, since under the circumstances vari-
ously disclosed such implied warranties were not negatived, they
werd available, and any restrictions imposed in the contracts, either
as to the requirement regarding notice or as to the remedies applic-
able, or otherwise, apply only to the express warranties of the
contract. In the instant case, however, as we have indicated, all
statutory or implied warranties, except as to title, are negatived
and excluded by the terms of the contract itself. But, insists the
defendant, in this respect the contract is in contravention of the
Sales Act (chapter 202 S. L. 1917), and to that extent it must be
held to b6 inoperative. With this contention we cannot agree.
The Uniform Sales Act is not intended to be a restriction upon
the rights of parties to contract. It is simply a statement of the
rules applicable in the construction of such contracts as may be
made. It does not contract for the parties; it measures their
rights under the contracts they themselves make. It does not pur-
port to create a mold in which all such contracts must be cast.
There is nothing contained within its provisions which can be said
to prohibit the inclusion of any lawful term that the parties may
desire in a contract for sale, nor is there anything therein contained
which can be said to avoid any lawful term or provision that may
be thus mutually agreed upon. See section 71 of the Sales Act;
Renne v. Volk (Wis.) 205 N. W. 385; Hunt v. Hurd, 205 Mich.
142, 171 N. W. 373; Cadillac Machine Co. v. Milchell-Diggins
Iron Co., 205 Mich. 107, 171 N. W. 479. See, also, Minneapolis
Steel & Machinery Co. v. Casey Land Agency, supra. We there-
fore hold that, the parties to the contract here in question having
by express terms negatived and excluded all implied warranties,
the defendant cannot claim the benefit of any such as might have
been available had the contract not done so.""'
There is, however, apparently some authority to the contrary.
For example, in Morris Run Coal Co., Inc., v. Carthage Sulphite
Pulp & Paper Co., Inc.,12 a written contract was entered into
whereby the plaintiff agreed to deliver certain coal screenings to
the defendant "as is." Some correspondence was previously had
with respect to the goods in which the plaintiff represented them as
of "good quality," but such terms were never incorporated in the
contract of sale. The goods proved to be wholly unfit for defend-
ant's particular use, and in an action by the plaintiff for the con-
tract price, defendant set up breach of warranty of fitness for the
particular purpose as a defense. The court held that:
"Even though the screenings were bought 'as is,' still there was
a representation that they were 'good' screenings. They were
UtSee also: J. B. Colt Co. v. Kocher, (Kan. 1927) 255 Pac. 48.
12(1924) 210 App. Div. 678, 206 N. Y. S. 676.
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known to be purchased for use in the defendants' furnaces, and
the representation that they were 'good,' together with their sale
for a known use, was a warranty that they were usable for the
purposes for which they were sold. Personal Property Law,
95, 96 (as added by Laws 1911, c. 571) ; Hawkins v. Pemberton,
51 N. Y. 198, 10 Am. Rep. 595; Prentice v. Fargo, 53 App. Div.
608, 65 N. Y. S. 1114. The jury should have been allowed to
pass on the question of the alleged breach of warranty."
The difficulty in this case lies in the submission of the question
of warranty to the jury, in view of the fact that the written con-
tract provided for delivery of the goods "as is." By virtue of
the parol evidence rule, all evidence of prior representations that
the goods were of "good quality" should be excluded as ineffective
to vary the express refusal in the final agreement to make any
warranties with respect to them. For similar reasons, evidenct
offered for the purpose of establishing the existence of implied
warranties of quality should have been excluded, since the provi-
sions of the contract above referred to effectually foreclose the
possibility of any inference that the buyer placed a justifiable re-
liance upon the judgment or skill of the seller as to quality.
Then it has been suggested that irrespective of the stipulations
in the written contract, the warranty of merchantability ought
always be implied because, it is said, there is a "presumption that
men who receive something of value in commercial transactions
intend to give in return, something of value." 18 Recognition of
that principle involves the recognition of the fact of sale (in, which
one party has received something of value) as the basis of implied
warranties of merchantability. It would also involve the recog-
nition of an implied warranty of merchantability in connection
with practically every sale. Fortunately, such is not the law.
As has been heretofore indicated, the sound legal basis for the
implication of any warranty of quality rests in the justifiable
reliance by the buyer upon the seller, and where the parties have
by written stipulation exhibited a clear intention to preclude such
reliance, it is difficult to conceive of any other basis upon which the
warranty may be predicated. The presumption above suggested
is, no doubt, ordinarily justifiable, but it certainly is not a con-
clusive presumption. As Professor Williston has aptly said:
"It must be possible, however, to sell unmerchantable goods
even if the seller is a dealer or manufacturer, and even though the
buyer either does not inspect the goods or his inspection in the
nature of the case can reveal nothing because the defects are latent.
13Swiff & Co. v. Etheridge, (1925) 190 N. C. 162, 129 S. E. 453,
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The ordinary way to do this is for the seller expressly to state
that the buyer must take the goods as they are."'"
2. WHERE THE PARTIES HAVE NOT DEALT WITH THE PARTICU-
LAR WARRANTY CONTRACTUALLY
At common law it was frequently stated as a general rule that
an express warranty in a contract for the sale of an article excluded
the idea of an implied warranty. To quote from the opinions:
"The contract sued upon contains the following express war-
ranty: 'The said party of the first part warrants said goods,
stock and fixtures free of any debt, mortgage, incumbrance, or
adverse claim of any kind.' . . . The contract containing an ex-
press warranty excludes the idea of any other warranty than that
so expressed."'15
"Upon the subject of implied warranty we are of opinion that
the case is ruled by Monroe v. Hickox, Mull & Hill Co., 144 Mich.
30, 107 N. W. 719. We think defendants counsel are correct in
the claim that there can be no implied warranty when one is ex-
pressed; that the undertaking of the defendant to replace promptly
all defective parts constituted a warranty within the doctrine of
the case above cited.' 6
"We will say, in passing, that the pleadings and evidence on
the part of the defendant in the case were directed to an express
warranty, and the case was tried upon the theory of an express
warranty. We think that under these circumstances an implied
warranty was excluded. This court has frequently held that an
express warranty excludes an implied warranty."' 7
"The only warranty in the sale of this machinery was the
express warranty found in the contract. There can be no implied
warranty, if there is an express one."'
That rule, applied as broadly as stated, would include all cases
of class (3) and exclude all implied warranties in those cases.
Fortunately, in none of the cases was the rule so broadly applied
as stated. An examination of them will reveal that in each there
was either an inconsistent express warranty, or, a clause in the con-
tract indicating an unwillingness of the seller to be bound by any
obligations not expressed in the contract.'9 Hence, it cannot be
said that there is any direct authority supporting the rule, but
141 Williston, Sales, 2nd ed., 471.1t5Thomas v. Thomas, (1906) 146 Ala. 533, 41 So. 141.
'
6 Hall v. Duplex-Power ,Car Co., (1912) 168 Mich. 643, 135 N. W.
118.
'
7American Varnish Co. v. Globe Furniture Co., (1917) 199 Mich.
316, 165 N. W. 1050.
18 Gaar. Scott & Co. v. Hodges, (Ky. 1906) 90 S. W. 580.
19In Thomas v. Thomas, (1906) 146 Ala. 533. 41 So. 141, there was
an inconsistent express warranty; likewise in Hall v. Duplex-Power
Car Co.. (1912) 168 Mich. 643, 135 N. W. 118; in American Varnish
Co. v. Globe Furniture Co., (1917) 199 Mich. 316, 165 N. W. 1050.
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rather that it must be relegated to that class of vaguely defined and
loosely used ideas and principles which we continually encounter
in the discussion of legal problems, and which are the genesis of
many legal formulations leading to doubtful conclusions.
The inference of reliance by the buyer on the skill and judg-
ment of the seller, which is the basis of any implied warranty of
quality, arises from the nature of the contract, relative position of
the parties with reference to the goods, method of conducting the
transaction, and the kind of goods to be sold. By what rule of
reason, then, would the presence in the contract of a written war-
ranty of title rebut and exclude the inference of reliance with re-
spect to quality and the resultant implied warranty of quality? Is
there anything at all inconsistent in the implication of a warranty
of quality in such cases? A substantial number of courts, directly
confronted with the question, rightly decided there was not,20 and
so with the Sales Act, which provides in section 15 (6) that "an
express warranty or condition does not negative a warranty or
condition implied under this act unless inconsistent therewith."
As a rule of reason the parol evidence rule would not, there-
fore, render ineffective parol evidence to establish the basis for an
there was a stipulation in the written contract which the court con-
strued as an agreement excluding warranties; there was an incon-
sistent express warranty in Gaar, Scott & Co. v. Hodges, (Ky. 1906)
90 S. W. 580. Whether or not an express warranty is inconsistent
with a proposed implied warranty is, of course, dependent upon the
particular facts of each case. A similar problem of construction
arises when it is claimed that a stipulation in the contract excludes
a proposed implied warranty. It is probably impossible to reconcile
all of the decisions on these questions.20Illinois Zinc Co. v. Semple, (Kan. 1927) 255 Pac. 78; Loxterkamp
v. Lininger Implement Co., (1910) 147 Ia. 29, 125 N. W. 830; Boulware
v. Victor Automobile Mfg. Co., (1911) 152 Mo. App. 567, 134 S. W. 7:
Crankshaw v. Schweizer Mfg. Co.. (1907) 1 Ga. App. 363, 58 S. E. 222
(the court said: "Not infrequently a mere shade of difference deter-
mines whether the issue calls for the application of the doctrine of im-
plied warranty or excludes it. In many cases, in our experience, the
line of demarcation was very dim, and we think there can be cases
in which, as to different portions of even the same transaction, the
law of express warranty will control so far as there has been express
warranty without excluding the application of an implied warranty
to other portions of the contract. We are aware that this statement
seems contradictory, and is not in accord with the general view, for
in Johnson v. Latimer, (1883) 71 Ga. 470. it was held that 'it is only
in the absence of an express warranty that resort can be had to im-
plied warranty, and where there was an express warranty, the court
could refuse to charge on the subiect of implied warranty' . . . This
is an express holding that there can be no imDlied warranty, if there
is an express warranty. We yield to it as binding authority."); J. I.
Case Plow Works v. Niles & S. Co., (1895) 90 Wis. 590 63 N. W.
1013: Tnternational Harvester Co. v. Smith, (1906) 105 Va. 683,
54 S. E. 859.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
implied warranty of quality in cases of this class, even when the
express warranty contained in the contract is admittedly a con-
tractual obligation.
But it has been suggested that where the parties have reduced
their contract of sale to writing, the parol evidence rule makes
ineffective any parol evidence for the purpose of establishing war-
ranties, express or implied, not evidenced by the writing, and
irrespective of whether or not the writing contains an express
warranty.2"
It is no part of this article to attempt a critical analysis of the
parol evidence rule as a rule. The rule is taken "as is" and the
problem to be considered here is solely one of application. 2 2 It can
no longer be doubted that the rule is one of substantive law mak-
ing ineffective all parol evidence offered for the purpose of con-
tradicting, altering, or adding to the contractual obligations of the
parties insofar as they are expressed in the written contract-
thereby defining the legal limits of the enforceable contractual
obligations in all cases involving written contracts. 23 The basis
of the rule is the practical necessity for certainty with respect to
written contractual obligations, without which written contracts
would be reduced to the vicissitudes of oral agreements. But
implied warranties fall neither within the statement nor the reason
of the rule. They are not contractual obligations, but obligations
implied by law, resting not upon agreements or promissorif1 utter-
ances of the parties, but upon equitable principles of fairness be-
tween the parties, designed for the protection of the buyer who has
placed a justifiable reliance in the judgment and skill of the seller.
The use of parol evidence for the purpose of establishing such
warranties is, therefore, no infringement upon the contractual
obligations of the written contract of sale. The argument of the
court in Roeblings Sons & Co. v. Southern Power Co.24 gives full
support to that position. The court said:
"In some of the decisions, both in this and in other states,
broad language has sometimes been used to the effect that an ex-
21Kullman, Salz & Co. v. Sugar Apparatus Mfg. Co., (1908) 153
Cal. 725, 96 Pac. 369.2
-This is a problem not dealt with in the Sales Act. Therefore it
must be solved on common law principles.2aThere are a number of Well-settled "exceptions" (or limitations)
to the parol evidence rule, which will qualify this general statement.
However, we are not here interested in such limitations, since what
is wanted is a solution 'based upon a situation to which none of the
limitations extend.24(1914) 142 Ga. 464, 83 S. E. 138.
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press warranty excludes an implied warranty; but such expres-
sions are to be considered in connection with. the question involved
in the case in which they were used. It would seem to be wholly
illogical and unreasonable to say, if in the sale of goods the title
was expressly warranted, this excluded all implied warranty of
merchantability or of the absence of latent defects, or, on the other
hand, that if there was an express warranty that goods were of a
certain character or quality, it excluded an implied warranty that
the seller had a valid title to them. There is no conflict between
the two, and one does not overlap or exclude the other. If a mer-
chant ordered coffee warranted to be equal to a given sample, he
certainly would not mean that he waived any question as to wheth-
er the seller owned the coffee. Where the express contract covers
or supersedes the implied warranty of the law, it excludes the lat-
ter; but where the two are not in any conflict, and the parties have
not undertaken by the express. warranty to cover the whole sub-
ject-matter of the sale and of the warranties which the law itself
implies, they are not excluded, except so far as the express war-
ranty deals with the subject-matter of the implied warranty.
"There is undoubtedly much confusion on this subject. The
theory that, where the parties have reduced their contract to writ-
ing, they will be presumed to have covered all matters touching
the sale, is only partially true. If a merchant should order goods
of a certain character, without specifying time for delivery, and
the order should be accepted, this would be an express contract,
and if in writing, an express written contract; and yet who doubts
that the law would imply that the delivery should be made within a
reasonable time? Nor is it likely that any one would contend that,
because the contract was reduced to writing, the law would imply
nothing further. If a contractor should agree in writing to com-
plete a house, specifying the size, number of rooms, etc., the law
would unquestionably imply that the work should be done in a
workmanlike manner, and if he agreed to furnish materials that
they should be proper and suitable for the purpose. Many in-
stances might be cited in which parties enter into express contracts,
and yet the law implies certain incidents or terms in regard to the
carrying out of the contract. So that the maxim, 'expressum
facit cessare tacitum,' has its limitations. Suppose that a purchaser
should order from a manufacturer a table warranted to be of
certain dimensions and with certain ornamentations; can it be con-
tended that this would exclude an implied warranty that the table
should be properly put together, and that such a contract would
be fulfilled by supplying a table with the dimensions and ornamen-
tations specified, although it might be constructed of such inferior
material as to fall down as soon as the purchaser should place a
dictionary upon it and turn to the word 'warranty'? Or if the paint
used was so improper in character as to soil or corrode everything
put upon it, or if the legs were fastened on with carpet tacks? Or,
if a piano should be warranted to be a genuine Knabe, would there
be no implied warranty that the manufacturer should sell a piano
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with proper chords and keys? Or if a carpenter should order
from a manufacturer an auger, specifying a certain length and
diameter and with a certain character of handle, would there not
be an implied contract or warranty that it should be an auger
which would bore? Could it be made of lead or pot metal, on the
theory that the specification of the size and handle excluded any
other contract or warranty implied by law? We are not now dis-
cussing a possible difference between implied terms in a contract,
and whether general descriptive terms are more properly to be
called warranties or agreements; but we are endeavoring to show
that an arbitrary and unlimited statement that, because a contact
as been made in writing, nothing else can be implied in regard
to the subject-matter, can be carried to such an extreme as to
result in a reductio ad absurdum.
"We are not contending that terms can be added to a written
contract by parol testimony, but that where the parties make a
written contract the law may make certain implications in regard
to the subject-matter, and that one of the things which it implies
in a sale of personalty is a warranty of certain things, unless that
warranty is excluded by reason of the terms of the contract itself
or by reason of the nature of the transaction. This is an implica-
tion which the law itself imposes, except under the circumstances
mentioned; and it is an entirely different matter from endeavoring
to superadd to a written contract parol agreements."
What has been said concerning the application of the parol evi-
dence rule to the cases of class (3), is equally applicable to and
decisive of the cases of class (4) .25
II.
Whether or not the parol evidence rule makes an oral war-
ranty of quality ineffective in connection with a written contract
of sale, is a matter upon which there is apparently an increasing
conflict of opinion. In a recent treatise upon the law of evidence
it is said that the rule as usually stated is to the effect that parol
testimony is legally ineffective to contradict, vary, add to or sub-
tract from the terms of a valid written instrument.28  That a
literal application of the rule, thus stated, to contracts, would neces-
sarily render ineffective anything in the nature of an oral warranty
is self-evident. But, with reference to contracts, the rule has been
25Miller v. Winters, (1913) 144 N. Y. S. 351; Sampson v. Frank
F. Pels Co., (1922) 199 App. Div. 854. 192 N. Y. S. 538; Elgin Jew-
elry Co. v. Estes, (1905) 122 Ga. 807, 50 S. E. 939.26Jones, Commentaries on Evidence, 2nd ed., 1483. And see:
Buser v. Everly, (1924) 115 Kan. 674, 224 Pac. 66; Brick v. Brick,
(1878) 98 U. S. 514, 25 L.Ed. 256; Childs v. South Jersey Amusement
Co.. (1923) 95 N. J. Eq. 207, 122 Atl. 803; Thompson v. Libby, (1885)
34 Minn. 374, 26 N. W. 1.
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so narrowed ipl application, that, as heretofore indicated, it oper-
ates only to protect the contractual obligations of the parties as they
appear in the writing, or are implied in fact from it.27 The extent
-of its effect, in this connection, is to prevent the alteration or
contradiction of the written agreements by any extrinsic evidence,
and an addition to the obligations of the contract by any evidence
of an extrinsic agreement.
A general survey of the authorities leaves no room to doubt
che accuracy of Professor Williston's observation that "there is no
more frequent application of the parol evidence rule than in cases
where it is sought to attach a parol warranty to a written sale or
contract to sell goods." 28 It seems evident that such holdings are
both desirable, and highly proper, under the application of the
rule mentioned above, when the written contract contains an incon-
sistent express warranty, or a stipulation excluding such a war-
ranty, for under those circumstances all courts regard the warranty
in the written contract, and the stipulation against warranties as
contractual obligations which the extrinsic evidence is intended to
vary or contradict.
But supposing a contract of sale in writing to contain neither a
warranty nor stipulation excluding warranties--can the parol evi-
dence rule logically be invoked in all cases for the purpose of
making extrinsic express warranties ineffective?
If the extrinsic warranty was omitted from the written con-
tract in question because of fraud, duress, or mistake, the authori-
ties are unanimous in denying the application of the rule,2 9 and
a similar pronouncement has been made where the written contract
is incomplete, 30 although there is some disagreement as to the
proper test of completeness, 31 and the soundness of such holdings
27Wigmore, Evidence, 2nd ed., 2433. And see: Strakosch v. Con-
necticut Trust and Safe Deposit Co., (1921) 96 Conn. 471, 114 Atl.
660; Johnson v. Burnham, (1921) 120 Me. 491, 115 Atl. 261; Means
v. Smith, (1908) 199 Mass. 319, 85 N. E. 165.2 8Sales, 2nd ed., sec. 215, citing, many cases accord. See also:
J. B. Colt Co. v. Farmer, (Mo. 1926) 286 S. W. 399; Stoehner & Pratt
Dodgem Corp. v. Greenburg, (1925) 250 Mass. 553, 146 N. E. 34;
Sorensen v. Webb, (1923) 37 Idaho 13, 214 Pac. 749; Monahan v.
Watson, (1923) 61 Cal. App. 417, 214 Pac. 1001.
29Wright v. General Carbonic Co., (1921) 271 Pa. 332, 114 Atl.
517.
30Ades v. Wash, (1923) 199 Ky. 687. 251 S. W. 970; Kilroy v.
Schimmel. (1922) 243 Mass. 262. 137 N. E. 366; Flannigan v. Byers,
(1923) 225 Mich. 66, 195 N. W. 820; Wheaton Roller Mill Co. v. Noye
Mfg. Co.. (1896) 66 Minn. 156, 68 N. W. 854; Eilers Music House v.
Oriental Co., (1912) 69 Wash. 618, 125 Pac. 1023.3 Thompson v. Libby, (1885) 34 Minn. 374, 26 N. W. 1.
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are not to be questioned. In the latter category should be put all
those cases in which the courts have given effect to the extrinsic
warranty because it constituted a separate agreement resting upon
an independent consideration, since it appears that the parties, in
all such cases, have regarded it as a part of the entire contract,
although not incorporated in the written contract in question22
Aside from those limitations, however, the rule has generally been
given unrestricted application to exclude extrinsic warranties
where the written contract expressed nothing as to warranties.
The basis for this application of the rule rests in the fact that the
courtg, for the most part, treat all express warranties as contractual
obligations, thus necessitating their exclusion as adding to the
obligations of the written contract by evidence of an extrinsic
agreement. And if the extrinsic warranty is, as a matter of fact,
contractual in each case, the application would seem to be entirely
proper. But express warranties are not necessarily contractual in
this country, although they are given that attribute by the English
law, under all circumstances, and for some time the same principle
was adhered to by some of our own courts.33 Therefore, if it be
supposed that the express warranty, which a buyer of goods is
seeking to establish against the seller, is. assertive rather than con-
tractual, it becomes exceedingly difficult to find a logical basis upon
which the parol evidence rule may be applied to exclude it.
The suggestion that every assertive warranty contains an im-
plied promissorial element and therefore logically justifies exclu-
sion by the parol evidence rule leads into a blind alley, for the
reason that in a large number of cases the implication could only
be one of law resulting in a quasi-contractual obligation, all of
which are unquestionably beyond the operation of the rule. In sup-
port of this conclusion, reference may be had to the appropriate
provisions of the American and English acts regulating the sales of
goods. The view is taken in England that an express warranty
is always contractual in fact, and the contractual characteristics
are indicted as existing in an express agreement or one implied in
fact. In section 61 (1) of the Sales of Goods Act, an express
warranty is defined as follows:
" 'Warranty' as regards England and Ireland means an agree-
ment with reference to goods which are the subject of a contract
of sale, but collateral to the main purpose of such contract, the
32Offenberg v. Arrow Distilleries Co., (1921) 222 Ill. App. -512.
83Heilbut v. Buckelton, [1913] A. C. 30; McFarland v. Newman,
(1839) 9 Watts (Pa.) 55, 34 Am. Dec. 497: Holmes v. Tyson, (1892)
147 Pa. 305, 23 Atl. 564.
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breach of which gives rise to a claim for damages, but not a right
to reject the goods and treat the contract as repudiated."
But one interpretation of this provision is possible--if there is no
express agreement with respect to goods sold, and if none can be
implied in fact, there can be no warranty.3 Thus assertive war-
ranties are automatically precluded, leaving only promissorial war-
ranties, to which, as above stated, the parol evidence rule undoubt-
edly applies.
It seems reasonable to suppose that the Sales Act, which was
patterned after the English Act, would have adopted the language
of the original statute with respect to warranties, if a similar doc-
trine had been intended. It has not done so. Section 12 of the
Sales Act provides:
"(Definition of Express Warranty.) Any affirmation of fact
or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is an express
warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is
to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer pur-
chases the goods relying thereon ...."
What is the reason for this clear cut distinction between an affirm-
ation of fact and a promise relating to the goods? Why was the
very lucid language of the English Act abandoned? Undoubtedly
for the purpose of expanding the English definition of warranty
to include assertions of fact relating to the subject matter of the
sale, which are neither expressly nor impliedly promissorial in
fact.35 And, though the courts have been slow to concede that
purpose, there is an increasing tendency to recognize and apply
it.38 It is submitted that such recognition logically requires a
modification of the application of the parol evidence rule so that
assertive parol warranties will be excepted from its operation.
CONCLUSION
Courts and writers have frequently said that the parol evidence
rule is a rule of policy requiring the exclusion of parol evidence
in order to preserve the certainty of written instruments. So
broad a principle is susceptible of two modes of application. It
may be liberally applied as a rule of policy, regardless of other
34Heilbut v. Buckelton, [1913] A. C. 30.
35See 27 Harv. L. Rev. 1. Under the Sales Act the nature of an
express warranty is always a subject of inquiry; under the Sales of
Goods Act it is not, since there can be but one kind.
asIreland v. Louis K. Liggett Co., (1922) 243 Mass. 243, 137 N. E.
371; Laline & Partridge, Inc., v. Hobbs, (Mass. 1926) 151 N. E. 59;
Missouri Paint & Varnish Co. v. Merck, (1926) 170 Ark. 1037, 282
S. W. 370; Ives v. Anderson Engine & Foundry Co., (Ark. 1927)
292 S. W. 111.
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rational considerations, or it may be vigorously applied chiefly as a
rule of reason, diverging only when, and to the extent that prac-
tical considerations clearly demand it. From the many so-called
"exceptions" to the parol evidence rule it seems apparent that the
courts have rather unanimously chosen the latter alternative.
Therefore it may be said that the rule should not be applied to ex-
clude evidence of assertive parol warranties, or parol evidence of
implied warranties, solely on the basis of policy unless there are
practical considerations clearly demanding it. Are there such con-
siderations? What are they?
There art few practical considerations (exclusive of logical
considerations) requiring the rejection of any parol evidence in
connection.with sales contracts-on the contrary much parol evi-
dence is used in that connection, and for a great variety of pur-
poses. There are no practical considerations requiring that a
seller of goods should be protected from liability for a parol war-
ranty at the expense of the buyer. Under modern selling practices
the seller more frequently has the potential advantage over the
buyer of having dictated the contract, and of being better informed
as to the legal consequences of the transaction. In fact, he is
usually in a position to dominate the sale by reason of his experi-
ence, method of approach and expert knowledge. If policy is to
protect anyone, the buyer would seem to be the logical recipient
of its benefits.
In reviewing what has been said it must be pointed out that the
purpose of suggesting any changes in the application of the parol
evidence rule is to harmonize the use of the rule and the expres-
sions of intention with respect to the establishment of warranties
as indicated by the Sales Act. A logical construction of the act
and a logical application of the rule (no other mode of application
being necessary-or even desirable) will, it is believed, acknowl-
edge the legal effectiveness of:
Implied warranties,
(1) when the written contract of sale contains no agree-
ment excluding such warranties,
(2) when it contains no inconsistent express warranty.
Parol express warranties,
(1) when such warranties were omitted from the written
contract by reason of fraud, duress, or mistake, etc.,
(2) when the written contract is incomplete,
(3) when, the written contract containing no inconsistent
warranty and no agreement excluding warranties, the
parol warranty is assertive only.
